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2

ARGUMENT
A.

CASTLETON HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
HE IS CHALLENGING ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

Zoll claims in his brief ("Oppos. Br.") that Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence
necessary to challenge seven of the trial court's factual findings, has made assertions
unsupported or contradicted by ilic avoid ;111« 1 has hulal to acknowledge facts supposedly
relevant to the issue of whether Zoll breached his fiduciary duties to Castleton. (Oppos. Br. at
19-26.)

This claim, however, lacks merit

As shown below, it is based on a

mischaracterization of the arguments in Castleton's brief ;tnid

11 ;i misconception of the

evidence in the record.
1.

Finding No. 11,

Zoll suggests ilut C'iistleioii is precluded from characterizing ZoH's April 8, 1996
conduct as an "ambush" because it is supposedly contradicted by Finding No 11 n finding
that Castleton is not challenging. (Oppos. Br. at 20.) This suggestion is unconvincing. As a
descriptive label, the term "ambush" has factual support in ntiniei OILS portions of the record.
First, Finding No. 11 itself states that "Zoll did not advise Castleton that ihes \UT<
going to confront him at the meeting with an allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks."
(R. 1755.) It is a reasonable inference that ZoH's decision u> conceal the specific purpose of
the meeting was to help retain the element of surprise during the ensuing interrogation that Zoll
planned to> conduct (or Ricks

In is hardly a stretch to characterize ZoH's purposeful set-up of

the encounter as an "ambush."

1

Further support for the term "ambush" includes the facts that:
— at the time of his encounter with Castleton, Zoll was Castleton's counsel of record in
the divorce case (Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-14; Loporto v. Hoegemarm. 982 P.2d
586, 589 (Utah App. 1999); Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1984); Lundberg v.
Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961); Rule 4-506 of Utah C. of Jud. Admin.);
— only two weeks before the encounter, ZoU's office had performed professional
services for which it had just billed Castleton (Trial Exh. 27 at App. K);1
— Zoll never urged or even suggested that Castleton engage his own independent legal
counsel to accompany him to the meeting (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107);
— Zoll failed to recommend the retention of independent counsel even though he knew
the meeting with Castleton would address a "very serious situation" which was "really
sensitive [and] ugly" (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 125; Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1, App. C);
— Zoll failed to abort the meeting when Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll was
also serving as Castleton's lawyer (Trial Exh. 24);
— at the meeting, Zoll accused Castleton of having engaged in criminal conduct (Trial
Exh. 24 at p. 3);

1

Zoll suggests in his brief that this bill was a "mistake." (Oppos. Br. at p. 9, n. 5.) His sole support
for this suggestion is a citation to his pretrial deposition. However, that deposition is not a part of the record in
this appeal and cannot be considered. And even if it is considered, there is absolutely no evidence that Zoll told
Castleton the bill was a mistake before or at the time of the April 8, 1996 meeting.
Moreover, ZoU's representation to this Court that "no legal services were performed by Zoll on
Castleton's behalf on any case after February 14, 1995," see Oppos. Br. at 9, is contradicted by ZoU's own
billing statement in September 1995 (Trial Exh. 20 at p. 28) in which he billed Castleton $22.50 to prepare the
August 1995 demand letter. This billing statement twice characterizes the billed work as "professional services"
performed for Castleton. IcL

2

— Castleton's predicament at the meeting was, according to Zoll, " . . . like having a
kid with his hand in the cookie jar when |( 1asf ictonl rcali/ed we had the information [about the
inflated invoices]." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 115); and
— Zoll "facilitated [the seizure of Castleton's property] by getting the parties together
. . . "(Finding No. 15. 11. 1760).
Thus, Zoll's own testimony, the transcript of the parties' tnediiijti. and the trial court's
own findings fully justify the term "ambush" to describe the April 8, 1996 encounter.
2.

Finding No, 12.

Zoll next suggests that "Castleton asserts in his bi ief that Zoll threatened Castleton at
the April 8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if Castleton did not cooperate in
the civil action." (Oppos. Br. at ^ ) Castleton, however, has asserted no such thing in his
brief. He accepts and does not challenge Finding No. \J ihui ""/ nil mhiscd Castleton at the
meeting that his conduct was criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not
threaten to call the sheriff and liiiu; Mi Castleton arrested, as Castleton claims." (R. 1755.)
Castleton's brief is faithful to this finding

('asiletom ne\ei argued in his brief that Zoll

"threatened" him with "arrest and criminal sanctions." All he wrote was that "the transcript
[of the April 8, 1996 meeting] also reflects that Zoll accused Castleton of engaging in criminal
misconduct by presenting inflated invoices to Ricks" (Castleton. Hi ai HI), i'Liti /oil's
misconduct included his ". . . accusation at the meeting that Castleton was guilty of criminal
misconduct" (Castleton Hi ,i» I'M1 .mil thai /oil "

accused Castleton of committing a

criminal act, [Zoll] pressed Castleton to explain what he had done, [Zoll] extracted a

3

confession, and, as the trial court concluded, [Zoll] 'facilitated' the confiscation of almost
every piece of property that Castleton owned" (Castleton Br. at 34).
None of these statements express the concept that Zoll threatened Castleton with "arrest
and criminal sanctions." By arguing otherwise, Zoll is misrepresenting Castleton's position.
3.

Finding No, 16,

Zoll also argues that "Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll pressured or exerted undue
influence on Castleton to force him into signing an agreement that acknowledge^] that the
taking of property by Ricks was 'consensual.'" (Oppos. Br. at 23.) Again, Castleton said no
such thing in his brief. What he did say was that " . . . given the plainly coercive nature of the
property transfer arrangement which Zoll 'facilitated,' and given his breach of fiduciary duty,
any such consent was obviously voidable [as a matter of law]." (Castleton Br. at p. 11, n. 13.)
Contrary to Zoll's suggestion, Castleton is not challenging the court's factual finding that the
settlement agreement Zoll prepared was voluntarily signed.

Rather, Castleton is only

challenging the legal conclusions that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary duty and that Castleton
is not entitled to void the tainted agreement Zoll prepared while still serving as Castleton's
lawyer.
4.

Finding No, 25,

Zoll claims that Castleton's statement that Zoll "simultaneously" represented Castleton
and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting is contradicted by Finding No. 25 in which the court
determined that ". . . as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorney-client relationship
between Zoll and Castleton." (Oppos. Br. at 21.) However, it is Castleton's position that, as
a matter of law, Zoll represented both parties by virtue of his legal status as counsel of record
4

in Castleton1 s divorce case. (Castleton Br. at 17-24.) So long as Zoll continued as counsel of
record in that ongoing case and tailed no withdraw, he legally remained Castleton's lawyer.
Id, Indeed, Zoll's own Notice of Withdrawal dated November 22, 1996 (Trial Exh. 14, App.
F) twice identifies Zoll as "Attorney for Plaintiff."
5.

Finding No. 26,

The transcript of the parties' conversation at the Apr il * I *>% meeting--a transcript that
the trial court expressly determined was accurate-reflects that Castleton immediately asked
Zoll to confirm that he was also serving as Castleton's lawyer. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2, App.
C.) This flatly contradicts Finding No. 26 in which the court ruled that " . . . neither Zoll nor
Castleton subjectively believed at the time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an
attorney-client relationship existing betwe* ^

i

ihese two facts are internally

inconsistent and are, on their face, fatally irreconcilable. Because Finding No. 26 is against
the clear weigh! ol Hie evidence and is enough to enable this Court to reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, it is clearly erroneous. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah
Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994).
6.

Finding No, 27,

In this finding, the court determined ili.il

objectively speaking Castleton could not

reasonably have [had] any expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll [existed] at
lhe lime ol tin: .- tpnl 19% meeting and after "

^

demonstrated in his opening brief, this finding is clear1* rr
24.)

5

1

^<M
.

\^ Castleton assiduously
-M

h ,: ^ 12, 17-

The portions of the record that Zoll cites to support Finding No. 27, see Oppos. Br. at
21, do not help him. For example, Zoll points first to the transcript of the parties' meeting.
(Trial Exh. 24.) However, it plainly reflects that near the beginning of the meeting, Castleton
asked Zoll to confirm that he was also serving as Castleton's lawyer.2 (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.)
In the same fashion, the settlement agreement (Trial Exh. 25) can be of no assistance to Zoll
on this issue because it was drafted the day after the April 8, 1996 encounter. Similarly, the
notice of termination (Trial Exh. 26) has no relevance to this issue because it too was drafted
and signed after the encounter.
Finally, Zoll points to Castleton's affidavit (Trial Exh. G) which states in relevant part
that Castleton "believed up until April 8, 1996 [Zoll] represented [Castleton]." (Trial Exh. G,
t 12.) This is entirely consistent with Castleton's inquiry to Zoll at the April 8, 1996 meeting,
"are you representing me too?" (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) It is also consistent with the previous
paragraph of the Castleton affidavit that Castleton's divorce was "still open," that Zoll "has
never withdrawn from [Castleton's] divorce case," and that "no withdrawal has ever been
communicated." (Trial Exh. 24, iff 21, 22.)

2

Zoll's explanation at trial of Castleton's request that Zoll confirm that he was serving as Castleton's
lawyer was that "[h]e said those words and in my opinion in a very rhetorical way, suggesting are you going to
jump in and help represent me in this matter." (Tr. at 1985 at 657:16-18.) Zoll further testified that Castleton
"wanted me to try to continue to go forward in helping him in just doing the accounting to resolve the matter even
though he knew I represented Mr. Ricks. I knew that his thinking was that 'I don't want to have to get a lawyer
for myself.'" (Tr. at R. 1985 at 658:18-23.) Therefore, contrary to Zoll's argument that this testimony tends to
support Finding No. 27, see Oppos. Br. at 21, the testimony actually supports Castleton's claim that until the
denouement of the April 8, 1996 meeting Zoll was helping, and would hopefully continue to help, Castleton.

6

7.

Finding No, 36,

As Castleton demonstrated in his opening brief, Finding No. 36~that "there is no
evidence whatsoever that ZoU had anything to do with the taking of additional property, the
damage while in Ricks1 possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that
he had agreed to return"-is flatly contradicted by:
(a)

the trial court's own factual finding that "ZoU was aware that certain

property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security
purposes [and] ZoU facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a
notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";3
(b) Zoll's own testimony that he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take
the property";4
(c) Zoll's own written notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had
confiscated Castleton's property-not only the computer and related equipment discussed at the
meeting, but "furnishings and the like from [Castleton's] apartment";5 and
(d) Zoll's own testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting
that was an essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.6

3

Finding No. 35, R. 1760.

4

Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5.

5

6

Trial Exh. 25, App. M.
Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3.

7

As such, Zoll is incorrect in his statement that Castleton has failed to properly challenge
Finding No. 36.7
B.

CASTLETON PROVED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
AGAINST ZOLL UNDER UTAH LAW,
1.

As the Subservient Party in the Fiduciary Relationship With
Zoll, Castleton is Entitled to the Protections Afforded by the
Kilpatrick, Wheeler, Von Hake and Baker Cases,

Zoll argues that Castleton failed to prove any of the elements necessary lo prevail on
his breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Oppos. Br. at 27-37.) In making this argument, however,
Zoll overlooks the specific components of relief that Castleton requested and misconceives the
potent protections that Utah fiduciary law affords a client who has been victimized by his
lawyer. This leads Zoll to the indefensible conclusion that he is somehow legally privileged to
take a position adverse to a current or former client if the client stops paying him, if the
remaining legal work to be completed is limited to the arguing of a pending objection which
only "center(s) on the insertion of four (4) phrases," if the client has allegedly misappropriated

7

Zoll's brief is replete with similar misstatements. For example, he states that Castleton argues in his
brief t h a t " . . . he later made arrangements to pay his bill by giving printed materials to Mr. Rawle." (Oppos. Br.
at 23.) However, Castleton's brief is devoid of any such statement. In addition, Zoll represents to the Court on
at least six occasions in his brief that Castleton "stole $72,000" from Ricks. (Oppos. Br. at 3, 4, 12, 17, 37 and
38.) There is no evidence to support this wild statement, and Zoll obviously offers none.
An additional example of Zoll's failure to be faithful to the record in his statement that "Castleton
failed to mention that the evidence also showed that Castleton and Roderick were engaged to be married and lived
together during the pendency of the action while acting as plaintiff and defendant." (Oppos. Br. at 24.) Castleton
indeed "mentioned" his marital status. See Castleton Br. at 4. What Castleton had no obligation to mention was
the plainly irrelevant fact that he and his fiance sometimes resided together.
Finally, Zoll states that Castleton sued him " . . . for $50 to $100 million in unsubstantiated damages."
(Oppos. Br. at 18.) This is ludicrous. On its face, Castleton's cross-claim sought damages against Zoll only "in
an amount to be established at trial." (R. 533.)

8

funds belonging to the lawyer's other (paying) client, or if the lawyer views his duty to file a
written notice of withdrawal as sufficiently "perfunctory." (Oppos. Br. at 32-35.)
Because Zollfs misconduct occurred while or shortly after he served as Castleton's
lawyer, Utah law affords Castleton an array of important protections. Thus, Castleton's crossclaim sought both an award of money damages against Zoll for his breach of fiduciary duty
and rescission of the Zoll-prepared settlement agreement which, Zoll has repeatedly argued,
reflects Castleton's voluntary, conclusive consent to the property seizure. (R. 531-32.) One
aspect of Castleton's fiduciary duty claim was that Zoll's misconduct substantially assisted
Zoll's other client in the unlawful confiscation of Castleton's property. (R. 1664; Tr. at R.
1983 at 6:15-20; R. 1985 at 1682-83.)
Each of these categories of relief-damages for Zoll's own misconduct, rescissionary
relief against the transaction tainted by Zoll's breaches of fiduciary duty, and damages for
Zoll's substantial assistance of his other client in the conversion of Castleton's property-is
plainly available under Utah law. See Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283,
1290 (Utah App. 1996) (recognizing claim for damages for lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty);
Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (recognizing claim
for rescissionary relief to void transactions tainted by fiduciary agent's breach of duty);
D.D.Z. v. Molerwav Freight Lines. Inc.. 880 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1994) (recognizing claim for
damages against tortfeasor who provides "substantial assistance" to another party in
accomplishing tort).
Therefore, Castleton is not arguing that ". . .the Kilpatrick case is not the controlling
authority in this case . . . ." (Oppos. Br. at 27.) Kilpatrick indeed sets forth the elements

9

necessary to establish a breach of fiduciary duty claim. What Zoll fails to understand is that
the settled principles of Wheeler, Von Hake, and Baker-that it is the fiduciary who has the
burden of proving absence of unfairness, and that it is the beneficiary who is entitled to void
the tainted transaction and recover damages if this burden is not met~supplement, and do not
supplant, the Kilpatrick elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.8 As this Court held in
Cunningham. 690 P.2d at 553, this presumption is not overcome if the fiduciary agent proves
that it acted even in "somewhat good faith."
The trial court's failure to follow the Wheeler line of cases contributed to its defective
legal conclusion that Zoll was guilty only of "very poor judgment."

(Finding No. 32, R.

1760.) At the very least, the court's failure improperly relieved Zoll of his heavy burden of
overcoming the presumption of unfairness by showing that he disclosed all material facts
relevant to the transaction and that

" . . . the transaction was fair and reasonable in all

respects." Wheeler. 763 P.2d at 760 (emphasis added). This fundamental misallocation of the
parties' respective burdens of proof fatally tainted all of the trial court's findings and resulting
conclusions. None of them can be sustained.

It is not true, as Zoll claims, that these principles apply only if the fiduciary agent has engaged in selfdealing. Although Wheeler involved self-dealing by a fiduciary, Von Hake and Baker did not. /aid neither of the
two cases on which Von Hake relied to support the principle that a presumption of unfairness arises once a
confidential relationship is proven-Cunningham v. Cunningham. 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1984), and Bradbury
v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965)~purported to limit the presumption solely to instances of selfdealing.
In any event, Zoll's misconduct in this case is the epitome of self-dealing. Zoll had previously
represented Ricks in several matters and considered him to be a "good" client because, unlike Castleton, he
always paid his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 102:1-17.) Zoll, therefore, was anxious to aggressively service the legal
needs of his paying client (Ricks) in taking a position adverse to his non-paying client (Castleton). By doing so,
Zoll enriched himself at the expense of his client/beneficiary, Castleton. This is a classic example of self-dealing.

10

2.

The Trial Court's Determination That Zoll Was Not
Castleton's Lawyer in April 1996 Cannot Stand,

Zoll's brief fails to address, let alone rebut, any of the controlling Utah cases and court
rules that until the lawyer validly withdraws, he or she remains as counsel and owes an
ongoing fiduciary duty to the client. (Compare Castleton Br. at 17-24 with Oppos. Br. at 2937.)9

Instead, Zoll attempts to rationalize his misconduct by suggesting that the requirement

of filing a notice of withdrawal is merely a "perfunctory task" that supposedly "does not
change the fact that Castleton was on notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as of
August 2, 1995." (Oppos. Br. at 35.) Zoll's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.

Zoll's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions is misplaced. In Barry v. Ashley Anderson. P.C., 718
F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (D. Colo. 1989), the reason the court decided that the attorney-client relationship ended
before the lawyer formally withdrew was that the lawyer, unlike Zoll, knew that the client was adequately
represented by replacement successor counsel. Barry. 718 F. Supp. at 1493. Because of this, the court properly
held that "while the substitution of counsel in a pending case can be fully effectuated for all purposes by court
order, where the old attorney's authority has been terminated and the new attorney's authority has been
recognized by the parties involved, the necessity for formal substitution may be unnecessary." IdL at 1494.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Zoll never confirmed that his authority had been terminated.
Indeed, his own paper trail-including his ill-fated August 1995 letter (which Zoll conceded was unclear), his
September 1995 billing statement (which billed Castleton for legal work performed the previous month), his April
1996 billing statement (which billed Castleton for one hour of professional services the previous month), and his
November 1996 notice of withdrawal (which twice identified Zoll as Castleton's lawyer)~belies his claim that he
no longer represented Castleton. Moreover, there is no evidence that Zoll's claimed de facto withdrawal was
"recognized by the parties involved." Indeed, Castleton made a partial payment in response to Zoll's demand
letter (Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22); Castleton readily accepted Zoll's invitation to go to his office to
discuss a legal matter (Castleton Br. at 32, 33); Castleton asked Zoll at the meeting to confirm that Zoll was still
his lawyer (Trial. Exh. 24 at p. 2); and, as late as November 1996, the lawyer for Castleton's former wife still
believed that Zoll still represented Castleton (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63).
In the same fashion, Ganser v. Corder. 980 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Kan. App. 1999), is inapplicable. The
basis for the court's decision that the parties' relationship ended before the lawyer obtained an order allowing him
to withdraw from the case was the undisputed and abundantly documented fact that the client had fired the lawyer
and " . . . from that point forward their relationship was adversarial." 980 P.2d at 1035. These facts are
conspicuously missing from the case at bar.

11

First, there is nothing in the text of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration or any reported Utah case to suggest that the requirement of a filed notice of
withdrawal is a merely ministerial or perfunctory function which can be blithely ignored.
Indeed, settled Utah case law such as Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App.
1999), Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1984), and Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d
987, 989 (Utah 1961), stress the critically important legal effect of a filed notice of
withdrawal. (See Castleton Br. at 18-21.)
Second, Zoll's inartful August 1995 letter was anything but a present declaration that
the attorney-client relationship was terminated. (Castleton Br. at 21-24.) Zoll used the future
tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if Castleton did not make arrangements to
begin paying his bill.10

(Tr. Exh. 21, App. J.)

Third, Zoll actually billed Castleton in

September 1995 for the time spent drafting the August 1995 letter. (Trial Exh. 20 at p. 28.)
Zoll's own bill twice characterized this work as "legal services." IdL Finally, Zoll billed
Castleton for one hour of professional services performed by his law firm in March 1996. (Tr.
Exh. 27, App. K.) These facts hardly support Zoll's suggestion that " . . . Castleton was on
notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as of August 2, 1995." (Oppos. Br. at 35.)

10

Indeed, Zoll used the future tense "will" even though he believed he had already withdrawn and that
Castleton understood this. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 76-79.) Because Castleton made a partial payment and Zoll never
told him it was not enough to assure that Zoll would continue as Castleton's lawyer, Castleton fulfilled the
condition of Zoll's letter that Castleton make arrangements to begin payment of his bill. Clearly, if Zoll believed
that Castleton's partial payment was not enough to justify Zoll's continuing as Castleton's lawyer, it was Zoll who
was obligated to notify Castleton of that fact; it was not Castleton who was obligated to read Zoll's mind.
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Zoll's next effort to escape liability for his professional mistreatment of Castleton is the
suggestion that the pending objection in the divorce case dealt with "only" four separate issues
directed to the form of the order. (Oppos. Br. at 33.) Zoll, however, offers no authority for
the proposition that the pendency of a written objection that a lawyer has prepared and filed
can simply be ignored and that it does not preclude the lawyer from unilaterally withdrawing
from the case.
Finally, Zollfs assertion that by April 1996 the divorce case was " . . . essentially over
and the objection was moot [because Castleton supposedly had withdrawn it]," Oppos. Br. at
35, is not only ludicrous, it is unsupported by any citation to the record. Zoll offers no
authority to support his transparently dubious theory that a lawyer's fiduciary duty to refrain
from harming the client somehow vanishes if the lawyer can show (which Zoll cannot in this
case) that the underlying case is "essentially over." Unimaginable mischief would arise if
lawyers were allowed to switch client allegiances based on their own subjective beliefs that a
case was "essentially over," especially where the objective evidence-such as the lawyer's
demand letter, the lawyer's billing statements, the court's file, and the lawyer's written notice
of withdrawal—all suggest otherwise. This Court should reject such an approach.
C.

ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CASTLETON
WHEN HE TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO CASTLETON
AFTER
RECEIVING
CASTLETON'S
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION,

A fundamental aspect of the lawyer's fiduciary duty of honesty and fair dealing is to
refrain from " . . . representing] interests adverse to those of the client." Kilpatrick. 909 P.2d
at 1290 (quoting Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1966)). This rule applies with
equal force to prohibit lawyers from disclosing confidential information that was entrusted with
13

them by former clients. Margulies bv Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1202-04 (Utah
1985). Under applicable Utah law-including Margulies. Kilpatrick. and Houghton1 ^-there is a
presumption that if the past and present representations are "substantially factually related," the
lawyer acquired and used confidential information against the former client.

(See Castleton

Br. at 25-29.)
In this case, the trial court committed manifest legal error in concluding that there was
no distinct factual connection between the three cases in which Zoll previously represented
Castleton and the case in which Zoll represented Ricks against Castleton. (See Castleton Br. at
26-29.) The prior and current representations shared a common factual link-the nature, extent
and value of Castleton's assets, income and liabilities in a dispute with a third-party creditor
seeking to collect a debt from Castleton. This made the representations "substantially factually
related" and triggered the irrebutable presumption that Zoll used Castleton's confidential
financial information against him.
It was reversible error to place on Castleton the burden of proving how he was
disadvantaged when Zoll took a position adverse to him.

Utah law mandated that the onus be

placed on Zoll. Because the trial court failed to apply this presumption, its resulting factual
findings and legal conclusions—Finding Nos. 29-31 and Conclusion Nos. 5-8—cannot stand and
should be vacated.

11

962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998).
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D.

ZOLL WAS THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
CASTLETON'S DAMAGES,

CAUSE OF

Zoll accurately quotes Utah law that "to prevail on legal malpractice actions, clients
must establish actual cause-that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not have
occurred-and proximate cause-that a reasonable likelihood exists that they would have
ultimately benefited." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291. These elements were established here.
1.

Cause in Fact,

The evidence that Zoll was the actual cause of Castleton's loss is overwhelming. It
includes:
1.

It was Zoll who induced Castleton to come to Zoll's office (Finding No. 11, R.

2.

It was Zoll who, before the ill-fated encounter, concealed the actual purpose of

1755);

the meeting, idL;
3.

It was Zoll who failed to prepare or provide any oral or written disclosures of

any potential conflict of interest in his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks (Tr.
atR. 1983, pp. 106, 107);
4.

It was Zoll who failed to have either client sign any waiver of conflict, id.;

5.

It was Zoll who failed to tell Castleton it would be prudent for him to retain

independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the
implications of the conflict of interest, i(L;
6.

It was Zoll who accused Castleton of criminal misconduct (Trial Exh. 24 at p.

2); and
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7.

It was Zoll who "facilitated" Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property by ". . .

getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and an agreement
between the parties" (Finding No. 35, R. 1760).
But for Zoll's misconduct, there would have been no self-help seizure of Castleton's
property. Zoll was, therefore, the cause in fact of Castleton's loss.
2.

Proximate Cause.

In the same fashion, Zoll was the legal cause of Castleton's loss for at least two
reasons.
First, it is obvious that if Zoll had honored his fiduciary duty to Castleton, the latenight, vigilante raid of Castleton's apartment and seizure of his property would never have
occurred. Zoll's fulfillment of his duties of loyalty and fair dealing meant that the April 8,
1996 meeting would have been aborted to allow Castleton to assess the implications of Zoll's
sudden shift of professional allegiance from Castleton to Zoll's other client and Castleton's
just-identified adversary, Ricks. Castleton then would have had the opportunity to engage
independent counsel, free from Zoll's heavy-handed and grossly unfair inquisition and
accusation of criminal misconduct.

To say the least, Castleton would have "ultimately

benefited" had Zoll faithfully discharged his fiduciary duty.
Second, when and if this Court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Zoll did not
breach his fiduciary duty, Castleton, as the aggrieved subservient party in the fiduciary
relationship, is entitled (under the Wheeler line of cases, supra, at 8-10) to set aside the entire
tainted transaction in which Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's property. Once the
transaction is vacated, Castleton is entitled to either a restoration of the status quo as it existed
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just before ZoU facilitated the seizure, or an award of damages for the full value of the
property. This relief is not necessarily dependent upon an additional showing that ZoU's
misconduct was the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. Under Utah law, once the breach of
fiduciary duty is established, the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief. Wheeler. 763 P.2d at
760 (Utah 1988); Van Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P.2d at 636.
Therefore, the trial court's determination that ZoU's misconduct was neither the actual
nor legal cause of Castleton's losses was based on a clear misreading of Utah fiduciary duty
case law. The trial court's findings and conclusions on these issues must be reversed.
E.

CASTLETON SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES AS A
DIRECT RESULT OF ZOLL'S MISCONDUCT,

While the trial court determined that Castleton failed to prove that ZoU breached any
duty to Castleton or that ZoU was the factual or legal cause of Castleton's injuries, the court
did not determine that Castleton failed to prove the existence or amount of damages. Rather, it
only found that Castleton " . . . produced no evidence to establish a nexus between ZoU's
conduct and his claimed damages." (Finding No. 39, R. 1761.) On that basis, the court
concluded that "Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to ZoU's
action." (Conclusion No. 13, R. 1763.)
Because the court's findings and conclusions rejected Castleton's damage claim only in
terms of causation, and not in terms of fact or amount, there is no merit to ZoU's suggestion
that " . . . there is no definitive proof that Ricks took equipment that belonged to Castleton as
opposed to property belonging to Roderick." (Oppos. Br. at 43.) Indeed, Castleton adduced
extensive, largely unrebutted documentary evidence to establish the nature, extent and value of
the property which ZoU helped plunder. (Trial Exhs. 28-36.) In the face of this evidence and
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the clear absence of any finding or conclusion that Castleton failed to prove the fact or amount
of damages, Zoll's argument to the contrary is bogus.
CONCLUSION
For at least the reasons advanced in both this and Castleton's opening brief, the Court
should either (a) rule, as a matter of law, that ZoU breached his fiduciary duty to Castleton and
remand for a determination of Castleton's damages, or (b) grant a new trial with instructions to
apply the legal principles so plainly missing from the first trial.
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